What do they do?
Tribune Resources Limited (TBR) is an Australian gold miner and explorer that holds interests in mines located in Western Australia, West Africa and the Philippines.
Market Cap: AU$326.35M

Investment Case

Undervalued Gold Play
TLDR; Gold on hand is worth $6.66 per share. Future cashflows are worth ~$4.50 at a 22% discount rate. Total value per share = $11.17. Currently trading at $6.22.
Tribune trades at around a discount of 50% to Net Asset Value (NAV), whereas the sector average premium is 140% (excluding TBR). There is a discount applied to small producers (under 100Koz); however, new operations in Japa and Diwalwal are likely to increase production in the coming years.
The company reports inventory at cost as shown in their September 2020 annual report.
Gold on the balance sheet is represented as $163m (gold on hand + stockpiles). At current market prices (AU$2465/oz), this represents a value of ~$350m or $6.66 per share.
Low-Cost Producer
Tribune has averaged very high margins (17% net profit) over the last ten years, as well as a high return on invested capital (11%). These numbers are some of the best in the sector and appear to be increasing in recent years. The company is expanding into new operations in Ghana and the Phillippines. Japa, the Ghana resource was reported as a 1.81Moz resource in July 2020. These operations secure the immediate future production of the company.
Management Team
The managers of Tribune have shown great skill in running a low-cost producer for the shareholders over many years. They have shown their ability to buy back shares when the stock price offers a great deal and develop long-term wealth for the shareholders. TBR has returned 201% over five years (dividends included), versus the market return of 59% over 5 years. Consequently, management are significant shareholders of Tribune.
Background & Current Events
Tribune Resources Ltd (ASX: TBR) was listed on ASX in 1987 and has been focused on the East Kundana Joint Venture (EKJV) held by TBR (36.75%), Rand Mining Ltd (ASX: RND) (12.25%) and Northern Star Resources Ltd (ASX: NST) (51% and operator). The EKJV is situated 25km west-north-west of Kalgoorlie (WA).
Since 2013, EKJV ore has been treated at the Greenfields (FMR Investments), Kanowna Belle (NST: 100%) and Lakefields (Golden Mile Milling) gold plants. TBR has recently increased exploration at Japa (90% interest: Ghana) returning a maiden Resource of 1.81Moz and Diwalwal (80% economic interest: Philippines), as part of the company's diversification strategy.
Tribune is currently in an ongoing legal battle with Northern Star Resources (ASX:NST). They notified TBR that they would only process 35,000 tons of TBR ore as part of their EKJV agreement. TBR is challenging this decision.
Intrinsic Valuation (DCF)
Tribune in 2020 reported a negative free cash flow of around $6m. This is a symptom of the management choices and the nature of gold mining companies. Objectively, this is not good and makes our DCF analysis more complicated, but as we see later on, this may be a contribution to the interesting valuation this company has on the open market.
Lets first find a free cash flow amount that makes sense so we can run a discounted cash flow model. If we look at the margins of TBR, they have an average net profit margin (over the last ten years) of around 17% and FCF margin of 14%. Looking at the revenues, this is also lumpy because of the same reasons listed above regarding the negative free cash flow. For the revenues, let's take an average of the last three years, $241m. That gives us an average free cash flow of $33m (rounded down) to use in our discounted cash flow models.
For both our 5 and 10 year forecasts, we use a required rate of return or discount rate of 15% plus a margin of safety of 50%. The risk-free rate is 1%, and for the 10-year forecasts, we use a simple terminal value calculation.
I intentionally chose a large range of growth rates (0% - 20%), as gold mining companies are often at the mercy of the current gold price. TBR has shown an impressive revenue growth rate of around 13% for the last ten years. From these models above, we can see that their cash-generating abilities may be worth anywhere between $2 and $6.
Profitability
Return on Invested Capital 10 Year Average (ROIC): 11%
The average ROIC for TBR in the last three years is 14% suggesting that the management team is improving.
Net Profit Margin 10 Year Average: 17.4%
The net profit margin for the last three years has risen to 20%; another indication that the management team is improving.
Liquidity
Current Ratio: 8.07
A current ratio of over 8 is very high. This means Tribune has 8.07 times their current debt in current assets, so they will not have an issue in paying those debts.
Quick Ratio: 0.6
This measures immediate liquidity, so Tribune would need to sell some of its gold in inventory to cover all of its current liabilities.
Solvency
Debt-to-Equity: 0.13This number is very low, meaning that the company does not have high financial leverage. This low debt to equity is a choice of the management team and makes the business very resilient in downturns in the economy or gold price.
Interest Coverage: 292Tribune has 292 times its interest expense, a very high but good number.
Efficiency
All-in sustaining costs (AISC): $1068/ounce
The all-in sustaining costs is an important metric for gold producers, as it measures the total costs per ounce of gold mined.
Dividends: $0.20c
Tribune has recently started paying a small fully franked dividend of 20c. In recent years they have also declared one-off large special dividends to sell off some of the gold on its balance sheet and provide returns to shareholders.
EV/EBITDA: 3.5
EV / EBITDA is an easy ratio we can use to gauge the company's pricing relative to its market value. We get an EV/EBITDA of 3.5. An EV/EBITDA of under ten is generally seen as healthy, so 3.5 is great.

Horizontal Analysis

Over nine years, we see that all four revenue, EPS, shareholders equity and net income has grown over 10% each year on average. We see that these growth rates are slowing down slightly with lower growth rates over three years. The -50% growth in revenue and -4% in equity is because of the large sale of gold in the previous year, inflating the revenue and lowering the equity.
These growth rates are encouraging; it seems like the company has some advantages over its peers, and the management team is doing a good job.

Vertical Analysis

Vertical analysis is a technique that expresses each financial statement item as a percent of total revenues.
TBR boasts a 28% operating margin which places it in the top 20% of the industry. It also has a 14% free cash flow margin which is increasing. The capital expenditures are also heading in the right direction, declining at 13% per annum.

Relative Valuation

Inter-company & Industry Average Analysis
Liquidity
The current ratio ranks in the 84% percentile for the sector. As is probably clear by now, management is conservative in how they manage their balance sheet.
Solvency
Debt to Equity for Tribune is very low, in line with the rest of the materials sector. Interest Coverage is also in the 100% percentile. Hence, Tribune has a lot of cash to meet debt requirements.
Efficiency
EV/EBITDA sits at the 86th percentile, with a value of 3.5. This is quite a good value, and TBR's position with respect to its peers demonstrates this.
Profitability
Return on invested capital (ROIC) is ranked at the 96% percentile. Note that this calculation of ROIC (21%) is different from ours, but they end up close to each other in the ranking relative to the sector (11% ROIC is 94% percentile).
Our net profit margin is in the 90th percentile, which is fantastic. This means that Tribune has a higher profit margin than the vast majority of the sector.

Qualitative Checks

Guru Interest
Do any 'gurus' hold the stock?
If they do, this may be a good sign that we are onto something. This is for your peace of mind, but if it is a small-cap stock, don't worry because it is probably too small for large guru investors!
This is the case for Tribune; however, we see that the Managing Director Anton Billis has a significant amount of his personal wealth (30%+) in the company. We like leaders with skin in the game.
Quality ScoreI score the company on a number of qualitative metrics which I like to see. These have been compiled over a number of books I have read and experiences. The checklist borrows heavily from BrianFeroldi on Twitter.
TBR gets a total score of 54%. This is low, but I'm a harsh marker. The key concerns are around the moat and current risks affecting the business, such as the move into Ghana and the lawsuit with NST. Naturally, this checklist will garner low scores for materials businesses and rightly so, as they have no pricing power and are often at the mercy of commodity prices.
On the other hand, we have a good management team, a sustainable moat, good performance, and a stellar balance sheet.

Checklist

There are many qualitative checks in my list, around management, moat, the general industry, some specific metrics, and more. I built it up through experience, reading and learning from other successful investors.
Did you double-check your information and numbers?
A crucial step! Use a different source for your information and numbers. I have checked this.
Does management do what they said they were going to do?
We have to read past annual reports to figure this out. Get to know the management team well. I support the management teams decisions.
Are they in the top 25% of the industry for ROIC?
Tick; they are just in the 94th+ percentile.
​
Invert - What's the worst downside scenario?
You have to think, what are the possible downsides and large risks facing the business. Look for the opinions of those shorting the stock to get an idea of this. Open-mindedness is key. For me, this is a case of management serving their own interests and destroying the company. I feel that the likelihood of this happening is very low, but could have a catastrophic downside. Luckily for us, the product sold by Tribune is very liquid (gold), and the inventory can be sold off almost instantly.
Another risk would be the current expanding operations into Ghana completely fail. This would greatly shorten the runway for the company, with them depending more heavily on established mines in Australia. The current management team many need help to fully capitalise on their expansion overseas. The downside of this scenario is significant but not catastrophic.
The current lawsuit between TBR and their joint venture partners NST is still playing out. TBR has been impacted as its milling capacity has been reduced by NST. Without a background in law or looking at the contracts, it is hard to say what will be the outcome of this lawsuit. The uncertainty may continue to drive the price down in the short-term but long-term I don't see this having an impact.
Clearly state the management and moat:
This is something you can only learn from reading publications from the business and management team. We can use the numbers we have above as evidence for these claims.
The management is a long-standing team, lead by the founder Anton Billis. The management team has demonstrated its ability to run the company in the interests of the shareholders, and management are significant shareholders.
The moat is my major gripe with TBR. As a gold miner, their only moat is low-cost production. This moat has proven steady over the years, but competitors can decrease their costs too, which may impact TBR's price. I have confidence they can continue this moat.
Is it a high uncertainty, low-risk bet?I see this as a bet with a high expected value. As the gold in inventory is roughly equal to the total market cap of the company, the downside risk is limited. Management also buys back shares when the price dips, as they also recognise this. A major downswing in gold prices could send the value of the company down, but I put this as unlikely.
I see much more upside in the possible upswing in gold prices, as well as the greater market realising the value of TBR's inventory. If the market were to re-price TBR to match other similar gold companies, there would be a significant increase in the share price. Heads I lose a little, tails, I win big.
Are management buying shares or the company buying back shares?Management has demonstrated their ability to buy back shares when they are cheap, as they did in early 2020. The team already have significant amounts invested in the company.
How sure are the reoccurring revenues?
We have seen the total gold mined from their various deposits slowly decrease over the years, which we can expect to continue. Again, their reoccurring revenue can be supplemented for several years using the existing gold on the balance sheet. The new mines that will open in the near future are hard to quantify, but should also help supplement their existing operations and revenues.
Unexpected events such as the seismic event earlier in 2020 are hard to account for, but we can factor these in as unlikely. Something that may happen every few years and have a -2% to -20% on production.

Valuation Thesis

Thesis 1: TBR continues to trade at the same multiple; new mines are not successful.
We assume similar production levels at EKJV, 42,000 oz, and 0 oz from new mines. Given TBR's average FCF margin of 14% over the last ten years, this equals a free cash flow of $14.5m. We also assume that this FCF will reduce -5% per year over ten years. Using a DCF model with these numbers and an 8% discount rate, we get a value of $123m, or $2.35 per share.
Assuming that TBR maintains its 50% discount to NAV, and its equity grows at 5% per year, its inventory would grow from $168m to $273m.
In total, this would be $396m or $7.54 per share. This ends up as a 2% compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) from the current share price of $6.25 over ten years. Pretty bad in normal circumstances, but for the downside case, pretty good!
Thesis 2: TBR continues to trade at the same multiple; new mines are successful.Production levels of 42,000 oz at EKJV decreasing at -5% a year, then production levels of 25,000 oz starting at year five from the new mines, increasing at 10% per year. This is a conservative estimate. This results in a value of $316m or $6.01 per share.
With the same inventory of $273m as calculated above and the same discount to NAV, this results in a total value of $589m or $11.21 per share. This represents a CAGR of 6% per year.
Thesis 3: TBR's gold is recognised by the market and trades similar to other gold companies. New mines are not successful.
As calculated above a value of $123m or $2.35 per share for the EKJV, but this gold and the current gold on the balance sheet is valued similarly to its peers.
If TBR is valued at 140% of NAV like its gold producer peers, then with $123 from EKJV and $273m of gold accounted at cost on the balance sheet would translate to $1,089m ($396m at 50% NAV * 2.75 = ~140% NAV). This is $20.74 per share, for a CAGR of 12%.
​
Thesis 4: TBR's gold is recognised and now trades similar to other gold companies. New mines are successful.
The best-case scenario benefits from the $316m ($6.01/share) from EKJV and new mines, and the bump in NAV ($273m) discount. This results in $1,619m or $30.83 per share, representing a CAGR of 17% over ten years.

Catalyst

The catalyst for the re-valuation of Tribunes gold on hand would be driven by the company increasing its production in line with some of the bigger players. There is a discount in NAV for the smaller gold producers. Given the new Japa and Diwalwal operations, these mines seem promising enough to push TBR into the higher gold producer valuation multiples.
Footnote: For all of these estimates, I have been conservative and rounded down each number. It's possible that the mines produce much more or less than my estimates, but I always err on the side of caution.

Pass or Watch?

Given my analysis above, it seems to me that TBR may be trading at a reasonable margin of safety for me. I would put this on the watchlist and watch it very closely.
https://valueinvestingscientist.com/valuation-analysis-of-tribune-resources-asxtb - full source with pictures / graphs and more finance stuff.

Hi guys, I just read all the Football Leaks articles on Spiegel so far and made a bit of a summary, since I am sure most of you don't want to read everything (the summary is still long, but way shorter than the articles, believe me).
So for who is not informed, German newspaper and investigators Spiegel, together with lots of other newspapers did investigate and research the (second part of the) documents they received from Football Leaks, a portuguese hackergroup. This is 3,4TB of data which means about 70 million documents. They published the first articles, but there are many more to come in the next few weeks. More coming also on the topics doping, betting fraud and racism.
​
Man City:
In 2013 former French President Nicolas Sarkozy tried to raise money with the help of ManCity president Khaldoon Al Mubarak. A year later when ManCity was investigated by UEFA for FFP violation, Al Mubarak asked Sarkozy for help, who spoke with FIFA president Infantino. In the last 7 years Abu Dhabi has injected €2.7 billion into ManCity. In 2016 Infantino chose to directly negotiate an agreement with ManCity, and therefore bypassing the investigating chamber of UEFA. Between 2009 and 2011 ManCity has made a loss of €451M. ManCity threatened to take legal action against UEFA, if they would make them pay a penalty. 2014 the president of the investigating company of the UEFA recommended to exclude ManCity from the Championsleague. Infantino intervened and negotiated with City manager (and ex Barça VP) Ferran Soriano. Infantino actually told Soriano that he should make a proposal for the fine they would have to pay, so that it looks like FFP is still intact. In the end they settled on a $60m fine, which then Al Mubarak refused to pay. Infantino intervened again to make the fine drop to 20m, which UEFA investigating chamber initially refused to agree to. PSG was angry that ManCity's fine would be lowered, so the UEFA president promised PSG that their fine would also go down to 20m, while lying to Abu Dhabi that PSG's fine would be much higher than theirs. Since that agreement ManCity have spent €700m on new players. ManCity Secretary General Simon Cliff wrote after the death of one of the investigation chamber members in an email "one has fallen, there are six left."
EDIT (05.11.18): Additional Info
The year FFP was introduced, ManCity spent 9.9M pounds too much, apparently because of the termination of Mancini's contract. The only solution according to an Email where Chief Financial Officer Jorge Chumillas wrote "an additional amount of Abu Dhabi sponsorship revenues, that covers this gap". CEO Ferran Soriano suggested having sponsors pay the amounts they have to pay for the victory of the FA cup, even though ManCity had not won the FA cup. Ten days later many different apparently according to City "fully independent" sponsorship deals were adjusted, Etihad paying 1.5M more, Aabar 0.5M more, and the tourism authority 5.5M more than the deals they negotiated at the begin of the season. When Chumillas asked Simon Pearce if the dates of the sponsorship deals could be modified the answer was "of course, we can do what we want". Already in 2010 ManCity made a 15M deal with Aabar, who according to an email from Simon Pearce would only pay 3M, the rest comes from quote "his highness" (the sheikh). In December 2013 Pearce wrote that Etihad's (mainsponsor) contribution is 8M. According to the contract it should have been 35M. In 2015 Etihad officially had to pay 67.5M pounds per year, but inoficially they were still paying just 8M, the rest coming from the Abu Dhabi United Group, who give companies like Etihad the money to then give it to ManCity, so that everything appears in order.
Edit (06.11.18): Additional info from a new article
Another plan get Abu Dhabi money to the club was called "Project Longbow" (because the English used longbows to beat the French [in this context UEFA president Platini] at Crecy and Agincourt). This meant using parallel companies like Fordham to outsource the cost of image rights. 2013 ManCity sold the image rights of the players to the company that would later be called Fordham Sports Image Rights, which is attached to a company in the British Virgin Islands. This way money from Abu Dhabi could be injected. Officially Fordham paid players, without receiving anything themselves which UEFA investigators found suspicious, ManCity claimed that Fordham is an independent company and they don't know their business plan but agreed to the deal because it came at a good price. ManCity have recently stopped selling the image rights of their players, but Fordham still exists and has made in 2017 total losses 75M pounds.
Edit (07.11.18): Additional info
Pep Guardiola signed the contract with ManCity already in October 2015, 2 months after his last season with Bayern started. His salary in his first season with ManCity was 13.5M pounds, in his second it is 16.75M. Several weeks later a journalist from Sunday Mirror wrote that Guardiola has met with ManCity director of football Txiki Begiristain in Barcelona to discuss a possible deal. At this moment the deal was already long signed. ManCity then said this is wrong information and told the newspaper to remove the article. ManCity also compiled a riskreport on a potential sponsor called Arabtec, who have a terrible human rights record in UAE. Their marketing team advised them to not accept the deal, because it would let City appear in a bad light, but they went through with the deal anyways, but made it only a regional deal, in those countries were democratic values and human rights are not always a priority.
Edit (10.11.18): Another part
Since 2010 Manchester City has invested over a million euros a year in the so called "Right to Dream Academy" which has it's locations in African countries like Ghana. These children get a good education, but have also to work and travel a lot, and some around the age of 10 for example said that they have only time to call their parents on weekends, because their training schedule is so packed. Manchester City documents are referring to that invested money as "venture capital". The main point is not to have them at some point play for Manchester City's first team, but to loan and sell them, to make profit. After FIFA implemented new years in the last years, ManCity had to make changes at that academy, for example the Academy leader has taken control over a Danish team called FC Nordsjaelland, so that the academy players from Ghana can come to Europe through that club. There is an agreement that the Danish club can't sell Right to Dream Academy players without ManCity's permission. For being the third party club in that affair, they get 25% of the transferfee.
Edit (10.11.18): Now this should be the last part about ManCity
In 2015 City tried to get De Bruyne for 50M, but VW Wolfsburg didn't want to sell, because Volkswagen doesn't need the money. ManCity were pressuring them and ultimately they sold him for 75M. A year later they both Bayern and ManCity tried to get Sané, but ManCity offered to 20 year old a salary of 24.5M pounds over 3 years. Spending money like that was possible because they were able to increase and back-date sponsoring contracts with companies from Abu Dhabi at will. Also the TV money helps, last year they received €170M from the league, which is for example 75% higher than what FC Bayern gets. This helps making it possible paying salaries like €11M/year for Gündogan or >18M for Aguero.
Already in 2009 they were studying how to make the most profit and came to the conclusion that it's not enough to own just one club, but instead create a global network of subsidiaries which makes it easier to bring in profits. Back then Roberto Mancini signed 2 contracts on the same day: as coach for ManCity and as "adviser" to the Al Jazira Sports and Cultural Club in the Arabian Gulf League, both clubs owned by Sheikh Mansour. ManCity paid him a salary of 1.45M pounds, but the Abu Dhabi club paid him an even higher salary extra of 1.75M per year.
To create such a network, they not only own Manchester City, New York City and Melbourne City but have also stakes in league teams in Uruguay, Spain and Japan. Also they have cooperation agreements with clubs in Scandinavia and with an African Youth academy. Uruguay because there are many quality footballers & the local teams have limited budgets, also they didn't need to pay any taxes on the profits from player transfers. The investment in Girona is so that ManCity's academy players can develop and play in competetive men's football.
In 2008 City was bought for 100M pounds, in 2015 a Chinese media company bought 13% of the stakes of the City Football Group for 265M pounds, which shows that the value of ManCity has increased by a factor of atleast 10 in the last 7 years and Sheikh Mansour believes that there can be created a way higher value from football than what has been established until now.
​
PSG:
PSG received in total €1.8 billion from Qatar. They were also close to being excluded from UCL, but Platini and Infantino covered it up. Nicolas Sarkozy told Emir of Qatar Tamim Al-Thani in a meeting in 2010 that if he bought PSG & launched a sports channel in France (BeIN Sports), that he would instruct Michel Platini to award Qatar the 2022 World Cup.
Edit (07.11.18): Mbappé's transfer to PSG
Contract details about Mbappé at PSG are revealed. In the summer 2017 he nearly signed for Real Madrid, who offered €180M. His father was worried about the competition he would have at Madrid with forwards such as Ronaldo, Benzema, Bale. At the beginning of August he then told Monaco he would sign for PSG, who also agreed to pay 180M. The contract demands were 5M upfront and a salary of a total of 50M net over 5 years. Also he would receive an extra 30k/month to pay for his personal staff. He also demanded that in case he would win the Balon d'Or, his salary would rise so far, that he is the highest paid PSG player (more than Neymar). PSG refused. In case PSG would be excluded from UCL because of FFP, Mbappé's family wanted a monetary compensation. Monaco's owner received €124M out of the deal. The strange thing is that portoguese superagent Jorge Mendes (who is not Mbappé's agent) also received atleast 7.25M out of the deal. Spiegel are not exactly sure, but they say documents hint, that it might be for playing up the speculation that he would sign for Real Madrid, to increase his price.
Edit (10.11.18): Racism at PSG's scouting department
PSG had a recruitment policy which lasted from 2013 until Spring of this year, which discriminated against ethnic minorities at youth academy level. An example is when a talent called Yann Gboho was 13, PSG did not make an offer, only because he is black. The scout rated him highly, but he wasn't signed by the club after a meeting between people working at PSG's academy, because of his skin color. Until Spring 2018 the scouts had in their scouting documents to note the "origin" of players between the 4 categories: French, Maghrebi, West Indian and Black African. A PSG scout agreed to Mediapart that it should say white rather than French, because all the players they scout are French. PSG doesn't want them to sign players born in Africa, because you can't be sure of their date of birth, he said.
Note: After this was leak was published PSG made a comunicado, confirming the use of these scouting forms with illegal contents which were instituted on the personal initiative of the head of this department. They condemn all forms of discrimination and racism and already made an internal investigation at the beginning of last october to understand how such practices could exist and to decide on the necessary measures to take.
General:
In the coming weeks they will reveal the positive doping tests (note: plural) of a worldclass player who won the Championsleague multiple times. (Note: not many fit that criteria except Real Madrid players and some Barça players). Also the tax avoidance models of some EPL titans.
​
European SuperLeague:
The developments of a possible European Super League are more advanced than we thought. There is a binding term sheet thought to be signed this month. Started was this project by Bayern president Rumenigge. This would include 16 clubs. Bayern did already make research if the law made it possible to leave Bundesliga to join a Super League and also if they could forbid their players to play for the nationalteam. This would mean that these clubs wouldn't be part of Championsleague or National Leagues like La Liga anymore, and have every week a game against another European giant. This would totally mess up the balance between big and small teams in Football, and would overall be a disaster for Football. UEFA obviously trying to avoid this is heavily pressured and even blackmailed by ECA and the top clubs, which did lead to a reform, which allots greater revenues to those clubs that have found success in the last 10 years in the Champions League and Europa League. This means that there is less money for Europaleague and therefore smaller clubs .The reform also gave the ECA 4 director slots in a company joined with UEFA (one of which ex Barça board member Raul Sanllehi will fill), which will oversee all deals the UEFA makes. Bayern director Gerlinger who was the most essential person in all of this says the Super League was a possibility but is "as far away as ever". Meanwhile Real Madrid received on Octover 22 an email titled "Draft of an Agreement of the 16", which included the binding term sheet to create the Super League, which would be a breakaway from UEFA and the national leagues. This draft includes 11 founders (Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Manchester United, Juventus Turin, FC Chelsea, FC Arsenal, Paris Saint-Germain, Manchester City, FC Liverpool, AC Milan and Bayern Munich) who have secured membership for 20 years, and 5 guests (which would initially be Atlético Madrid, Borussia Dortmund, Olympique Marseille, Inter Milan and AS Roma). The competition would have two phases: a group round and a knockout round. A company in Spain would be registered to make this possible. Shares of this company would be distributed: Real Madrid holding 18.77 percent, Barcelona 17.61 percent and Manchester United 12.58 percent. Bayern Munich would be the fourth largest shareholder at 8.29 percent.
​
More about Infantino:
Infantino also was vital that half of the money FIFA made would be distributed to the Associations in advance, without any control about what they would do with it (so that he would get reelected). In 2017 the investigators investigating Infantino were replaced by María Claudia Rojas, who has no experience in investigating, and is a good friend to the notoriously corrupt president of the columbian federation. She immediately cleared Infantino and did say that there are no investigations against him. After that also the FIFA code of ethics was changed (for example the word corruption disappearing). Rinaldo Arnold, a Swiss public prosecutor, is also a good friend with Infantino, who called him capo ("boss") in an email and who assured Infantino that the investigations wouldn't be against him and even offered to have the attorney general to publicly state that.
​
Edit: Added information from a new Article on 05.11.18
International Champions Cup (ICC):
A confidential document between Relevent Sports (note: the company organizing ICC and also want to have the Barça Girona game in the US) and FC Barcelona reveals how much money teams to play these friendlies: $3.25M per game. For the game against ManU there was a bonus of 750k, and for the Clásico in the USA a bonus of $6.5M. That's nearly $14M net for a week playing in the US with 3 games. In that contract were clauses: "if Messi didn't play for atleast 45min, Barça would receive 750k less, if Neymar didn't play 600k less, for Suárez 450k less".
According to Spiegel the chairman of Relevent Sports, Stillitano, has been trying for years to convince the biggest European clubs to play in a league, in which the best play against eachother. His goal is also to create a Superleague and lure them by showing them how big and plentiful the global revenues are.
​
Edit: Added information from a new article on 05.11.18 (info by Mediapart via @GFFN)
AS Monaco:
Apparently the AS Monaco owner and Russian billionaire Dmitry Rybolovlev attempted to hide a massive, illegal amount of funding into the team with a fictitious marketing contract and through the involvement of a series of offshore companies in the British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong. Over the time of 2 years he invested a total of €326M, which does violate the FFP. In 2014 a marketing deal was agreed to, that was in reality a yearly sum of €140M by Rybovlev. This deal did then later fell through, because the Dutch head of Swiss-based sports marketing agency had a disagreement with him and threatened to reveal the scam to UEFA. The Investigatory Chamber of UEFA did find some disturbing things, when going through Monacos finances, but the head of UEFA's FFP program Andrea Traverso did agree to help prepare the club for their Investigatory Chamber hearing.
By 2014 Monaco had made losses of €170M over 3 years. Because of their tiny city, they did not receive much money from ticket sales and sponsorship deals. Monaco's marketing director suggested to the president to build a close relationship with Platini, without "giving the slightest indication" that Monaco is violating FFP. Monaco made a marketing deal with AIM, which gave the agency the right to manage sponsorship and marketing for the club, but if Monaco did not make €140M per year revenue, AIM would have to pay the difference. The year before this deal Monaco had a total income (without TV money) of €14.4M, which would mean AIM has to pay €126M, which obviously is an absurd deal to make for AIM. This made Monaco have an income of 11m instead of losses of 116m like the year before. A company registered in the British Virgin Islands called City Concept Ventures "surprisingly" agreed to invest in AIM €140m for 10 years, exactly what they would have to pay to Monaco. The agency of AIM founder de Roos did receive €2.2M for participating in the scheme. This way the Monaco owner was able to put money into the club, through sponsorship contracts. This deal then later fell through, because Rybolovlev had fallen out with Prince Albert of Monaco and decided to stop investing into the club and therefore selling their players. UEFA never discovered this attempted scam.
​
Edit (06.11.18): Added information
Russian Clubs
Zenit St Petersburg, Dynamo Moscow & Lokomotiv Moscow all artificially inflated sponsorship contracts in order to avoid FFP sanctions & UEFA were complicit in this practice.
Edit (07.11.18): Added from a theblacksea.eu article
Zenit is owned by Gazprom, who pumped €113M into the club in 2012. UEFA was investigating in this. Zenit told them, that Russia's league has not the ability to generate revenues like European leagues and if they would have to comply with FFP, they would need to sell their best players. This would be very bad for Russia ahead of the world cup in 2018. UEFA seemed to accept that argument, because 6 months later they closed the case without excluding Zenit from the UCL. Similar things happened to Rubin Kazan, FC Lokomotiv Moscow and FC Dynamo Moscow. In the past 5 years the state Russia has injected over €1.65 billion into these clubs.
​
Edit (10.11.18): New article
"Superagent" Pinhas Zahavi and his involvement in deals like Neymar to PSG
Let's start this with a quote by him to the investigative journalist meeting him: "So, listen: I did the biggest transfers in the history of world football. There isn't a big deal in the world where I'm not involved," the agent said. "There's no place in international football where I don't have influence and power."
The Israeli playeragent Pinhas Zahavi is one of the most powerful agents in world football, who is already way longer involved in football transfers than agents such as Mendes or Raiola, he already was part of transfers in the 1970s. He is known to position footballers against their colleagues, coaches and club bosses, and trying to forcefully push for a move to a new club. As an agent he is nearly invisible. He normally doesn't speak to press and does only "appear in the shadows". No one knows how much money he has floating around or which channels it is floating through. Many of the companies he owns or works for are located in tax heavens such as Gibraltar, Cyprus, Malta, British Virgin Islands. He engages law firms in Brazil and Israel to provide him legal support. He often joins forces with other superagents such as Mendes, or Ramadani. There were investigations against him, but never was anything illegal proven. Officially he is paying his taxes in Israel. Many of his companies have their business accounts at banks in Switzerland.
Last summer Lewandowski asked him for help, so that he could leave Bayern. Zahavi spoke with Lewandowski's agent Barthels, who told him that Bayern wouldn't agree to let him leave. He then went to the German newspaper Bild and openly told them that Lewandowski wants to leave and Bayern are aware of it, which made it on the frontpage. However he did not succeed with his plan to have Lewandowski leave Bayern.
However he was a vital part of the Neymar to PSG deal. He was noted as second agent, apart from Neymar Sr. and was due to receive €10.7+2M from that deal. Zahavi wanted that this would be paid to one of his companies in either Switzerland or Cyprus, but PSG didn't agree to it and after some angry emails he accepted that the money would be paid to his accounts in Israel.
His commissions are negotiated on a deal-by-deal basis and always by mobile phone, so there are often no concrete documents, which makes it harder to track it. Also his companies in tax paradises are often buying the transferrights of young (often underage) talents, for example Markovic to Liverpool of which Zahavi's company had half the transferrights.
​
Edit (10.11.18): Article was behind a paywall on Mediapart, so I used the summary of someone of soccer, hope everything is correct
More about Neymar's move to PSG and also the "loyalty-bonus"
PSG had to pay each of his agents – his father Neymar Senior and Israeli agent Pini Zahavi – a commission sum of 10.7M + 8.7M for Santos. Total price of his transfer: €252M. Zahavi received a 1.5M payement the first year + 2M/year the next 4 years conditional on Neymar remaining with the club. His father received 6M the first year + 3M the following year. The operation to bring Neymar to Paris was codenamed “Gold”. Over a period of five years, the 25-year-old will cost PSG a total of 528 million euros. PSG first proposed a salary of 25M per year, but Neymar would succeed in obtaining 30M/year, free, for him, of social charges and tax. Means 54.7M/year for PSG. PSG were unable to reach an agreement that Neymar would not enter into deals with sponsors who were rivals of the club’s sponsors. PSG lacked the funds to meet the huge cost of the transfer. Information gained by the EIC suggests it was Qatar Sport Investment (QSI), owner of the club, which paid the entire amount.
Neymar wanted to make sure he was paid a bonus payment promised by Barça. This was a bonus sum of 64M agreed when he prolonged his contract exactly one year earlier. He had been paid 21M, but their remained a further 43 million euros that FC Barcelona was committed to pay him by midnight on July 30th 2017 at the latest. On the morning of July 31st, the money transfer had still not been made. FC Barcelona informed Neymar that the 43 million euros had been deposited with a solicitor and will be released to him only if the player certifies that he will remain with the club. Since then, a legal battle continues. The player is still demanding payment of the 43M, FC Barcelona are demanding that the player pays the club 73M representing a total refund of the bonuses that were offered to him for prolonging his contract. On August 22nd 2017, Tebas lodged his complaint against PSG with UEFA, accusing the French club of violation of the European football associations’ ruling body’s financial fair play rules, and ten days later UEFA opened its investigation into the matter. The probe was opened against a backdrop of not only the pressure of La Liga, but also the anger against PSG of other enemies, including German club Bayern Munich.
According to documents obtained from Football Leaks, paying off of the cost of Neymar’s transfer plus the player’s salary would amount to a total of 528 million euros up until 2022, equivalent to 105 million euros per year. That meant that PSG would have to attract more than 100 million euros in extra revenue each year, or sell players to compensate for the difference. Including Mbappe the number rises to 166M. PSG asked Nike for a sponsorship deal worth 100 million euros per year. Nike declined because the contract with PSG, which they paid just more than 20 million euros per year, was not due to expire until 2022.